Global sport-which encompasses the Olympic Movement-proclaims powerful and universal ideals, including human rights. At the same time, it seeks to govern itself in a special way through a values system committed to the neutrality, autonomy, and specificity of sport. Through a combination of power in the sports market and the twin legal forces of specific enabling legislation and compulsory arbitration, global sport has established a dominant position in its dealings with its major stakeholders. The people who make sport possible-the athletes and those affected by the magnitude of modern sporting events, including local communities, workers, children, journalists, and fans-have all suffered harm. These forces have given rise to three levels of athlete activism: (1) individual activism; (2) collective activism; and, more recently, (3) institutional activism. That activism is guided by its own values system grounded in a deep respect for human rights as well as sport and the dignity of pursuing sport for a living. Its objective is to culturally and legally reconcile sport and human rights. The challenge for global sport is to embrace the opportunity presented by athlete activism and ensure that sport is a genuine force for good.
I. Introduction
How America fractured in 1968. It was a violent year. Liberals reeled, a war dragged on and protests raged … Even from the distance of a half-century, the moment feels familiar.
1
The 50-year period that separates athlete activists Colin Kaepernick, Eric entrenched gender discrimination and pay inequity.
12 Others work institutionally to change the very system that places the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms in conflict with the practice of sport and to hold sport to account for harm caused to the rights of those it impacts and touches.
13
Taking a predominantly international perspective, this article examines the pressing need to legally reconcile sport and human rights. Its absence has given rise to three levels of athlete activism: (1) individual activism; (2) collective activism; and (3) institutional activism. That activism is guided by a powerful values system-developed by athletes over generations-that is grounded in a deep respect for human rights as well as sport and the dignity of pursuing sport for a living. However, as Section II introduces, there are significant substantive, cultural, and systemic barriers to athlete activism embedded in the governance of global sport.
Section III focuses on the renewal of individual and collective athlete activism in recent years and draws factual, political, and legal parallels between those forms of athlete activism from 50 years ago with today. Section III also posits that to bring about systemic and sustainable change, the fledgling form of institutional athlete activism is also required. Motivated by the desire to prevent and address the widespread abuse of the human rights of many groups engaged in and affected by sport, including athletes, local communities, workers, children, and fans, institutional activism aims to drive the reformation of global sports law by embedding internationally recognized human rights in the governance and legal framework of global sport.
Finally, Section IV explains that the challenge for global sport is to embrace reform and reconcile sport and human rights culturally, legally, and institutionally. This can ensure that sport is a genuine force for good in accordance with the values that purport to guide its governance.
II. Global Sport and Barriers to Athlete Activism

A. Global Sport
Global Sport and Global Sports Law
"Global sport," for the purposes of this article, consists of the Olympic Movement, the three main constituents of which are the International Olympic Committee ("IOC"), the International Sports Federations ("IFs"), and the National Olympic Committees ("NOCs").
14 It also encompasses "global sports law"-with its 12 component parts known variously as lex sportiva and 'Olympic law'-which is, in effect, law made by and imposed at the behest of sports governing bodies ("SGBs"). There "is a body of law created by reiterated decisions regarding sports disputes issued by the Court of Arbitration for Sport [("CAS")]," which has created jurisprudence referred to commonly as lex sportiva. 15 It also includes "the rules and regulations imposed by the SGBs and their interpretation by the CAS."
16 'Olympic law' comprises "laws created by a national legislature to satisfy the commercial demands of a private body" in the IOC. 17 The purpose of the law is to provide "the legal framework demanded by the IOC via the Host City Contract [("HCC")],"
18 especially in relation to ambush marketing and secondary ticket sales. The law has "an impact across borders" and "demonstrates how private entities can be the drivers of specific, self-interested legislation when operating as a transnational organisation."
19 'Olympic law' is "a distinctive type of sports law that is effectively forcibly transplanted from the host jurisdiction of one event to the next … [and] regularly used as a template for similar legal protections to be demanded by, or offered to, the organisers of other sporting mega-events." 20 "Global sport" and "global sports law" are deliberately chosen expressions. This is because lex sportiva and 'Olympic law' are not sourced in international law. "Global sports law is an autonomous legal system, having immunity from national legal systems … Under this global law paradigm, lex sportiva constitutes a separate and self-regulating legal order not subject to review by state authorities"
21 that has the "propensity … to displace national laws." 22 Due to the supporting nature of Swiss arbitration law, lex sportiva is "a 'specific global law without the state' … which is not the product of a global democracy but of a messy, invisible, political process involving a plurality of actors representing a conflicting set of interests."
23 'Olympic law' cannot be considered "international 15 24 Yet SGBs such as the IOC and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association ("FIFA") have a responsibility to respect human rights recognized by international law. The framework for doing so exists under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights ("UNGPs"), 25 the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ("OECD Guidelines"), 26 and the International Labour Organization ("ILO") Tripartite Declaration on Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy ("MNE Declaration"). 27 The responsibility "is a global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they operate," exists "independently of States' abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations," and "exists over and above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human rights." 28 The responsibility refers to, at a minimum, those expressed in The International Bill of Human Rights, 29 the International Labour Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-Up ("ILO Declaration"), 30 and additional international standards pertaining to vulnerable groups, 31 including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ("UNCRC").
32 Importantly, "[t]he universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question." The "international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner," on the same footing and emphasis. 34 In so doing, it proclaims powerful and universal ideals. According to the fundamental principles of Olympism as contained in the Olympic Charter, " [t] he goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity."
35 The IOC's mission is to "cooperate with the competent public or private organisations and authorities in the endeavour to place sport at the service of humanity and thereby to promote peace" and "oppose any political or commercial abuse of sport and athletes."
36 To this end, the "practice of sport is a human right," 37 and the "enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Olympic Charter shall be secured without discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."
38
In 2013, IOC President Thomas Bach told the United Nations General Assembly that the application of the "universal values and goals" shared by the IOC and the UN through a "universal law" depended on "[p]olitics respect[ing] … sporting autonomy."
39 It also follows, according to Bach, that "sport must remain politically neutral," 40 which necessitates that the IOC "oppose[s] boycotts of any kind" as they "are a fundamental contradiction to the spirit of sport, depriving it of the means to work for peace, mutual understanding and solidarity."
41
The Commonwealth Games Federation ("CGF"), in contrast to the IOC, righty acknowledges that "[t]he dial has shifted over the past several years" and "sports [ 40 Id., at 3. 41 Id., at 4. The autonomy of sport is recognized as the fifth fundamental principle of Olympism. See, Olympic Charter, supra, note 14, para. 5 at 11. 42 A.B.C., A Sport's Body that Embraces Politics? Welcome to the Commonwealth Games Federation (Apr. 14, 2018), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-08/a-sports-body-that-embraces-politics3f-welcome-to-the-commonwe/9630966 a safe space for taking brave action."
43 Unfortunately, global sport has not been a safe place; nor has it encouraged the taking of brave action. As a result, it has, on too many occasions, not been a force for good.
On March 23, 2018, the United Nations Human Rights Council ("UNHRC") had cause to address the Olympic ideals in light of the revelations of widespread athlete abuse in prominent Olympic sports, including gymnastics in the United States.
44 Having recalled the "purposes and principles of the Charter of the [UN]," "the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [("UDHR")] and relevant international human rights instruments,"
45 the UNHRC carried a resolution that calls on States to work with the IOC to "use sport as a tool to promote human rights, development, peace, dialogue and reconciliation."
46 The resolution describes the important shift that global sport must make to reconcile sport and human rights. First, the responsibility of the IOC is shared with other stakeholders. Second, the Olympic Charter sits in the context of internationally recognized human rights standards and principles.
47
B. Barriers to Athlete Activism
Athletes are "people first" and athletes a "distant second."
48 For former National Football League ("NFL") player and NFL Players Association ("NFLPA") Executive member Scott Fujita, "[f]ootball is a big part of what we do, but a very small part of who we are."
49 The relationship athletes have with their sport and profession involves "institutional thinking" and rules "which are deeply woven into the fabric of the people who practice them."
50 Athletes often have "a deep reverence for those who came before and built up the rules that [they have] temporarily taken delivery of" and "see themselves as debtors who owe something, not creditors to whom something is owed."
51 The inheritance and legacy understood by players can transcend their own cause. According to Fujita, "sports figures like Jackie Robinson, Billie Jean King and Muhammad Ali have been powerful agents for social change. That's why the messages athletes send 43 Id., (emphasis added). 44 -including the way they treat others and the words they use-can influence many people, especially children."
52 But there is a price to be paid, a price that is exacerbated by sport's reluctance to reconcile itself with the cause of human rights even though it is those who fight "against discrimination and for equality" who "end up on the right side of history."
53
In the Preamble to the UDHR, "the peoples of the [UN] … reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and … determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."
54 Whether athletes, globally, are presently entitled to the protection of a legal framework that is consistent with the advancement of internationally recognized human rights for both themselves and others is most uncertain. The seventh fundamental principle of Olympism prescribes that " [b] elonging to the Olympic Movement requires compliance with the Olympic Charter and recognition by the IOC."
55 From here begins a deep level of regulation and control of the athlete, which is of "extraordinary and far-reaching complexity."
56 It brings into focus the irreconcilability between sport and human rights, which starts with the conflict between the detail of the Olympic Charter and the fundamental principles that introduce it. That conflict establishes substantive, cultural, and systematic barriers to athlete activism. To qualify and compete at the Olympic Games, an athlete must satisfy the rules set by the IOC in addition to the requirements of his or her IF, NOC, and national federation ("NF"), making Olympic qualification a "complex process" that "raises important philosophical questions."
57 NOCs are vested with the power to "decide upon the entry of athletes … based not only on the sports performance of an athlete, but also on his ability to serve as an example to the sporting youth of his country. 64 and for any dispute to be submitted exclusively to the CAS in accordance with the Code for Sports-Related Arbitration ("CAS Code").
65
In addition to the express limitations of the Olympic Charter and 'Olympic law,' the body of lex sportiva in key respects purportedly "protects itself against the intrusion of state law by taking into account the fundamental norms of human rights and claiming that its standards and procedures have been formulated and are applied consistently with them." 66 However, "[t]hese are not conclusions that would necessarily follow if an external assessment were undertaken," especially by a "court located outside this values system."
67 Given the significant difficulties athletes confront accessing effective remedies outside the sporting framework, 68 athletes must primarily rely on the "legal structures that have been adopted [and which] have limited the extent of direct human rights evaluation."
69
In evaluating the human rights of athletes, global sports law has primarily drawn on the constitutional objectives and commitments of SGBs, such as the fundamental principles of Olympism. The CAS has considered that "these provisions are higher-ranking rules that prevail" over conflicting regulations of the SGB and render such regulations "invalid as inconsistent." 70 The CAS would permit constraints on even that limited articulation of rights through any proportionate means that achieves a "legitimate objective" of the SGB. "The requisite standard [for the SGB] to justify discrimination of a fundamental right … should be to a level higher than that of the balance of probabilities."
71 According to the CAS, "[s]uch an approach is consistent with the countervailing requirements for sport and is recognised in a wide range of domestic and international laws, including laws directed to the prohibition of discrimination generally."
72
By assuming that the requirements of sport will conflict with internationally recognized human rights, the CAS creates a risk that the rights of athletes and others will not be protected, respected, and upheld.
III. Athlete Activism
This Section examines individual, collective, and institutional athlete activism. It does so by considering each level of activism through two key athlete-driven endeavors, the reaction of global sport, and the key legal challenges that confront the activists.
A. Individual Athlete Activism
Freedom of Expression and Opinion
The right to freedom of expression and opinion is referred to in Article 19 of the UDHR and given legal effect under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 ("ICCPR"). 73 It serves as an enabler of all other rights. As the reactions to the activism of Smith, Carlos, Norman, Caslavska, Kaepernick, Wambach, Reid, and Guardiola make clear, 74 in global sport, "the interference with athletes' freedom of expression is more likely to come from employers or [SGBs]" than State actors. 75 The Olympic Charter's prohibition of political demonstration is a cornerstone of the IOC's purported commitment to remain at all times "strictly politically neutral." 76 However, the IOC's Technical Manual on Protocol prescribes that medal winners "shall face" their national flag during the playing of their countries national anthems. 77 The combination of the prohibition with a compulsory ceremony is significant, because participation in that ceremony conveys a contrived meaning that may be at odds with how certain individuals wish to express themselves. In the words of a 1943 judgment of the United States Supreme Court delivered by Justice Jackson, which upheld a challenge to an action of a State that made it compulsory for children in public schools to salute the flag and pledge allegiance:
The case is made difficult … because the flag involved is our own … To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous, instead of a compulsory routine, is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds … [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things which touch the heart of the existing order.
78
Disciplinary action taken by the IOC against athletes who protest during the Olympic Games would be reviewable by the ad hoc division of the CAS established for the Games and, possibly, in a court of competent jurisdiction including the Swiss Federal Tribunal ("SFT"), the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"), or the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR").
79 According to legal academic Johan Lindholm, the "circumstances of the individual case and the relative weight of the interests of the athlete and the [SGB] must be considered and balanced against each other," 80 and, "[w]hile this must be determined on a case-by-case basis, a lifetime ban, on the extreme end, would almost certainly be considered as disproportional."
81 Such review, however, must surely bring into question the lawfulness of the express prohibition, which, the IOC would likely argue, is both valid on its terms and a proportionate means of achieving its legitimate objective of political neutrality. In 2017, the ECJ concluded that "the desire to display, in relations with both public and private sector customers, a policy of political, philosophical or religious neutrality must be considered legitimate."
82
Any internal policy that contains a prohibition on workers must be "genuinely pursued in a consistent and systematic manner,"
83 be "limited to that which is strictly necessary," 84 and be "objectively justified … [by reference to] means of achieving that aim [that] are appropriate and necessary."
85
Whether the objective of political neutrality can now justify the prohibition of political demonstration is questionable. The Olympic Charter purports to impose a blanket prohibition on political demonstration, whereas it could follow the ICCPR, which provides that the right:
… carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 79 From Carlos to Kaepernick, supra, note 75, at 1. 80 Id., at 2. 81 Id., at 3. 82 Case C157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, (2015) , at para. 37, http://curia.europa. eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188852&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=l-st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=529203 83 Id., at para. 40. 84 Id., at para. 42. 85 Id., at para. 44. 86 ICCPR, supra, note 73, at article 19.3.
This would be consistent with the more nuanced approach now being taken by the CGF. Indeed, not only is it questionable whether the IOC would be able to meet the satisfactory evidentiary standard that prohibiting political protest such as that engaged in by Smith, Carlos, Norman, and Caslavska damaged the Games and therefore needs to be curtailed, it is arguable the very same protest in fact positively contributed to the advancement of the Olympic mission by "promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity."
87
According to former United States President Barack Obama, the "powerful silent protest [of Smith and Carlos] in the 1968 Games was controversial, but it woke folks up and created greater opportunity for those that followed."
88 On April 28, 2018, Peter Norman was given a post-humous Order of Merit by the Australian Olympic Committee ("AOC"), with AOC President and IOC Vice President John Coates stating, " [t] his is an overdue award there is no doubt … The respect for Peter and his actions is still enormous to this day. He believed in human rights throughout his life."
89 Caslavska, with the rise of Vaclav Havel to the presidency of Czechoslovakia, would become the head of the Czech Olympic Committee and the eighth woman appointed as a member of the IOC.
90
In any proceedings before the CAS, an athlete seeking to assert his or her fundamental right to freedom of political opinion and expression would need to overcome two preliminary legal hurdles. First, the conflict is not between a regulation of a SGB and the higher-ranking provision of the Olympic Charter, it is between two provisions of the Olympic Charter itself. Second, for there to even be an evidentiary burden for the IOC to satisfy to justify the prohibition, a constructive and expansive interpretation would need to be taken that the fundamental principles of Olympism in relation to peace and human rights entitle athletes to have their fundamental rights protected and respected when practicing sport, including in relation to freedom of expression and opinion. Otherwise, the express prohibitions would apply without context or reference to internationally recognized human rights. This is also because, notwithstanding the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines, the IOC has yet to take the steps necessary to embed respect for the fundamental rights of athletes into the Olympic Charter or the regulatory framework of global sport. 
The Right to Work and Access to an Effective Remedy
Sport has long sought to be immunized from the reach of the law.
92 According to an English court in 1964, this was achieved through the establishment of "an 87 Olympic Charter, supra, note 14, at 11. employers' system, set up in an industry where the employers have succeeded in establishing a monolithic front all over the world, and where it is clear that for the purpose of negotiation the employers are vastly more strongly organized than the employees."
93 Since that time, players from a variety of sports, including Major League Baseball ("MLB") player Curt Flood, have been willing to risk their careers and livelihoods so that their fellow professionals can enjoyas players-the same basic rights and freedoms that all citizens enjoy.
94 This has been achieved through the development of a body of case law from 1964 to 1995 in jurisdictions such as the United States, Europe, and Australia that was hard fought for and saw players legally recognized as workers, free to form and join unions and free to move in the exercise of their trade as professional athletes without the imposition of any unreasonable restraint.
95 Fundamental to the success of such individual athlete activism was the determination shown to win the internationally recognized human rights to "work, to free choice of employment, [and] to just and favourable conditions of work,"
96 as well as to "have an effective remedy" including "the possibility of judicial remedy" through a forum operating outside the values system and legal reach of SGBs.
97
That values system, enveloped as it can be in the "aura and mystique" of sport, can also affect the judgement of the judiciary.
98 Justice Blackmun, a liberal, wrote the majority Supreme Court opinion dismissing Flood's legal challenge to baseball's longstanding reserve clause on the basis of stare decisis. Only four of his opinion's 27 pages, described as an "ode to baseball,"
99 provided the reasoning for the decision, with Blackmun concluding that "[w]ith its reserve system enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly. At the global level, the status, representation, and freedom of athletes are all regulated by SGBs, 103 and, therefore, largely constrained by their values system, which has been entrenched by the "SFT's benevolence towards the CAS."
104
Claudia Pechstein, a German speed skater regarded as "one of the most successful champions in the history of the Olympic Games,"
105 has pursued legal channels through the CAS, the SFT, the German courts, and the ECtHR following a two-year suspension imposed by the International Skating Union ("ISU") for a doping offence "[n]ot as a result of a doping control having detected the presence of prohibited substances in her system, as is customarily the case, but as a result of anomalies which were revealed in her biological passport, suggesting she was doped."
106 Pechstein challenged the clause in her athlete's contract mandating arbitration by the CAS, relying on German competition law. The regional Court of Appeal of Munich (the Oberlandesgericht München, or "OLG") found for Pechstein on January 15, 2015, ruling that SGBs are in a dominant position and "[a]s a consequence, it is necessary to ascertain that they do not take advantage of this situation by forcing professional athletes to resort to the CAS in the event of a dispute." 107 The OLG found, in rendering the CAS arbitration clause between Pechstein and the ISU void, that the structure of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport ("ICAS"), which governs the CAS, gave SGBs "decisive influence" in selecting CAS arbitrators. On June 7, 2016, the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichstof, or "BGH") reversed the decision of the OLG. Like Flood's case, the decision can fairly be seen as one clouded by the mystique of sport, and inattentive to the struggles and sacrifices of Pechstein. The BGH based its decision in a number of important respects on the existence of a fictitious values system in world sport supposedly shared between SGBs and athletes:
A dominant influence of the federation involved in the proceedings in the present case cannot be deduced from the fact that the sports federations and the Olympic Committees globally have an important influence with respect to the composition of the list of arbitrators. 
110
In forming this view, the BGH stated that, " [t] he fact that the fight against doping is of paramount importance worldwide has never been denied by either party and is undisputed. Against this background, a uniform system of arbitration is intended to implement the anti-doping rules of the [WADC] in an effective manner and in accordance with uniform case law."
111 The BGH also stated that "it may be assumed that [Pechstein] would not have been admitted for participation in the competition if she had refused to also sign the arbitration agreement" and that, accordingly, the arbitration agreement was "imposed on her."
112
In weighing Pechstein's fundamental rights "to access to the courts" and to "a free exercise of one's profession [which] includes not only the right to choose and take up one's profession freely, but also the right to exercise that profession as one sees fit,"
113 the BGH deferred to the ISU's "autonomy as an association, which is equally guaranteed as a fundamental right,"
114 and the "specialist knowledge of the arbitrators."
115 Moreover, in balancing the interests of Pechstein and the ISU, the BGH had regard to the obligation of the ISU to comply with its obligations regarding the CAS and the WADC under the Olympic Charter in order to be recognized by the IOC, again demonstrating how the imposition of a legal obligation by a SGB on an athlete at the behest of another SGB (the IOC) is used in world sport as a balancing consideration to help justify a constraint on an athlete's fundamental rights.
116
The analysis of the BGH demonstrates how individual athlete activism can only succeed if the prevailing values system that informs dispute resolution in a sports-related context is objectively challenged together with the substantive aspects of the matter. The successful line of legal authorities between 1964 and 1995 recognized that the players were employees or workers, 117 a fundamental point not pressed by Pechstein despite the controlled and highly regulated environment in which many Olympic athletes are engaged.
118 These courts established that not only were the fundamental rights of players to pursue their profession being unreasonably and, therefore, unlawfully restrained, the same restraints were not in the best interests of sport. In the matter of doping, for example, serious questions remain about the effectiveness of the WADC. 119 Furthermore, the deference to the apparent specialist expertise of the CAS can exacerbate rather than address concerns for the human rights of athletes because the capacity of the CAS to deal with human rights-related matters is a highly pertinent and legitimate question. According to the seminal report prepared by Professor John Ruggie-the architect of the UNGPs-titled, "For the Game. For the World. FIFA and Human Rights" published in April 2016 ("FIFA Ruggie Report"):
120
… if an arbitration system is going to deal effectively with human rights-related complaints, it needs certain procedural and substantive protections to be able to deliver on that promise. While the FIFA dispute resolution system and the CAS' 300-plus arbitrators who sit at the peak of the system may be well equipped to resolve a great variety of football-related disputes, they generally lack human rights expertise.
121
The analysis of the BGH also demonstrates the importance for individual athlete activists in articulating how the combination between the IOC and a SGB-as reinforced through the CAS-not only heightens the dominant position of the SGB over the athlete, but is more correctly considered a business relationship that obliges both parties to act to prevent and mitigate adverse human rights impacts, including impacts to which they have not contributed.
122 This approach was correctly adopted by the European Commission ("EC") on December 8, 2017, when analyzing the anti-competitive impacts of the ISU's eligibility rules permitting the imposition of severe sanctions on athletes appearing in events not authorized by or under the auspices of the ISU. The EC concluded that the appeals procedure to the CAS-which, like Pechstein, the athletes had no choice but to accept-reinforced the restriction of their commercial freedom.
123
Under the UNGPs, "'business relationships' are understood to include relationships with business partners, entities in its value chain, and any other non-State or State entity directly linked to its business operations, products or services."
124 One of the strongest features of the relationship between the IOC and SGBs is the broad condemnation of athletes seeking access to judicial remedies, despite that being a fundamental right, including through express regulation and the making of threats to exclude athletes from major international 119 
B. Collective Athlete Activism
Freedom of Association and Effective Recognition of the Right to Collective Bargaining
The ILO's Decent Work Agenda involves "freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men."
126 In this way, it expresses the aspirations of modern athletes. The ever-increasing demands of professionalism-driven by the combined forces of economic growth and the increased prestige of sport for governments and business as well as SGBs-mean that just pay and conditions of work are now simply essential for both male and female athletes.
127 Coupled with increasing concerns over the negative human rights impacts of the activity of sport and SGBs on athletes, world sport is seeing the "normalisation of the right of players to organise"
128 and, as shown in Figure  1 associations that represents approximately 85,000 professional players through more than 100 player associations based in more than 60 countries. 138 The ILO Declaration "is universally recognized as essential for realizing the objective of decent work for all."
139
The ILO Declaration recognizes that economic growth "must be accompanied by a certain number of social ground rules founded on common values."
140
It understands that:
… the guarantee of fundamental principles and rights at work is of particular significance in that it enables the persons concerned to claim freely and on the basis of equality of opportunity their fair share of the wealth which they have helped to generate, and to achieve fully their human potential.
141
To achieve a position of relative equality in which players can share fairly in the wealth that they contribute to the creation of, a deep commitment to collective activism and the fundamental principles articulated in the ILO Declaration is essential, especially the enabling rights articulated in ILO C87 and 141 Id., at 5-6 (emphasis added). 1966 to 1982, described this as a "union consciousness" and something that was, prior to his appointment, lacking among players.
142 In Miller's words, players:
… didn't know what a union was, but they knew they didn't want one. There was a reason for this attitude. From time immemorial, the baseball powers-that-be force-fed the players propaganda: The commissioner (although appointed and paid by the owners) represented the players; players were privileged to get paid to play a kid's game; and (the biggest fairy tale of all) baseball was not a business and, in any event, was unprofitable to the owners.
143
Miller, with a background in the steelworkers union, was "shocked" by the workplace conditions facing the players.
144 "[S]teelworkers had a union mentality, while there was virtually no one in [MLB] who had ever associated with a union of any kind."
145 "[B]allplayers simply did not know how to voice [their] complaints-they had no place to go."
146
ILO C87 relevantly sets out the right for workers to "establish and … join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorisation,"
147 "exercise freely the right to organise,"
148 and "establish and join federations and confederations,"
149 which "shall have the right to affiliate with international organisations of workers."
150 Under ILO C98, "[w]orkers shall enjoy adequate protections against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their employment."
151 Workers' organizations "shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts of interference" from employers, 152 including, "[i]n particular, acts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers' organisations under the domination of employers or employer organizations, or to support workers' organisations by financial or other means, with the object of placing such organisations under the control of employers or employers' organisations."
153 ILO C98 also enshrines the right to collective bargaining, which encourages and promotes "the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' organisations and workers' organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements." 155 with "workers' representatives" defined to include "trade union representatives," or "elected representatives … who are freely elected by the workers … and whose functions do not include activities which are recognised as the exclusive prerogative of trade unions."
156
Where both trade union and elected representatives exist, "appropriate measures shall be taken, wherever necessary, to ensure that the existence of elected representatives is not used to undermine the position of the trade unions concerned … and to encourage co-operation on all relevant matters between the elected representatives and the trade unions concerned."
157
According to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association ("ILO FOA Committee"), there is no doubt that athletes are workers for the purposes of ILO C87, even where an employment relationship does not exist. In 2005, in response to a complaint bought by a football players' union in Mexico where players were denied the right to register their association as a trade union on the basis, among others, that they had to firstly prove they had working relationships with clubs, the ILO FOA Committee concluded that "the criterion for determining the persons covered by the right to establish and join organisations of their own choosing is not dependent on the existence of an employment relationship … [S]elf-employed workers in general or those who practice liberal professions nevertheless enjoy the right to organize."
158
The freedoms to associate and to bargain collectively are "enabling rights [which] make it possible to promote and realize decent conditions at work."
159
They depend on a "conducive and enabling environment," 160 which can be absent from the governance of SGBs, especially at the global level. The shocking conditions that today confront many athletes, as evinced by the widespread abuse of their human and labor rights, 161 are commonly accompanied by an institutionalized environment that regulates and controls rather than enables the voice of the athletes and a lack of union consciousness among nominated athlete representatives. This includes the systems of work promoted by key actors in global sport.
The IOC Athletes' Commission, for example, is constituted pursuant to Rule 21.1 of the Olympic Charter, to be elected by "athletes participating in the Olympic Games … in accordance with regulations adopted by the IOC Executive 155 Board, in consultation with the Athletes' Commission." 162 The IOC President has decisive influence in relation to all IOC commissions, and "establishes their terms of reference, designates all their members and decides their dissolution once he considers that they have fulfilled their mandates."
163 Members of the IOC Athletes' Commission must be nominated by their NOC. 164 Other members can also be appointed by the IOC President. 165 The ICAS recognizes the "athlete commissions of the IOC, IFs and NOCs" to bring to its attention the names and qualifications of "personalities [for appointment] to the list of CAS arbitrators."
166
The IOC also encourages the establishment of athlete commissions within IFs and NOCs. At a national level, the Athletes' Commission Charter of the AOC, for instance, obliges each member of the commission not to act in the best interests of the athletes or even sport, but "solely in the best interests of the Committee [i.e., the AOC] and its members as a whole." 167 According to Nick Butler, a senior reporter with Inside the Games, the "IOC Athletes' Commission is elected and is in theory independent, although it is staffed by members of the IOC administration and, in recent years, invariably follows the whims of the IOC leadership."
168
The World Anti-Doping Agency ("WADA") has also established an athlete committee, which it funds and supports. The committee's stated role is to "serve as the voice of clean athletes, encouraging integrity and fairness for sport and athletes."
169 It is appointed by the Committee's chair and the President of WADA in consultation with WADA's Director General.
170 The committee's terms of reference require all Committee members to comply with WADA's media relations policy. 171 The response by WADA to the initial moves to establish the WPA in 2011 is an example of the concerns SGBs express with the organization of athletes into trade unions. Former WADA Chairman John Fahey told the WADA Foundation Board on November 20, 2011, that "it was incumbent on all who believed that sport was a very different and separate operation to other workplaces to make that clear" and that, "under no circumstance would [ Accordingly, on three matters that crucially impact the human rights of athletes (including their labor and economic rights)-the Olympic Charter, and arbitration by the CAS and the WADC-the representation of athletes is regulated and controlled by SGBs. The outcomes of that representation are then compulsorily incorporated into the employment contracts signed by players such as professional footballers, cricketers, and rugby players even where they are members of unions that are authorized to negotiate employment-related matters. It is estimated, for example, that some 80,000 professional team athletes are so bound by the WADC but excluded from the processes by which the WADC is developed, promulgated, and implemented.
174 However, the IOC's responsibilities under the UNGPs, together with the IOC's position of "supreme authority and leadership" of the Olympic Movement, 175 mean that the IOC is both obliged and has the leverage to ensure that the rights of players to organize and bargain collectively in accordance with the ILO Declaration are not only respected by the IOC itself but also by IFs, NOCs, SGBs, and those that employ or otherwise engage athletes.
176
The German Athletes' Commission ("GAC") has been understandably apprehensive to embrace and build a union consciousness in its determined efforts to establish an independent representative voice for athletes, an effort described as an "athlete revolution of German sport." 177 The fledgling body, which subsequently secured €225,000 in startup funding from the German government, 178 avoided being structured and described as a trade union.
179 "The [chosen] wording indicates that this endeavor could have trade union traits, even if such a vocabulary is avoided. The new initiative, which was once actually discussed as an athlete union, will formally become an association supporting the athletes commission."
180
The GAC has quickly sought to address an issue at the heart of the player and broader trade union movements and recognized by the ILO Declaration-the right to share in the wealth created by the efforts of one's labor. By letter dated May 25, 2018, the body-which presently exists "inside the German NOC" 181 -wrote to Bach noting that "[a]thletes worldwide, with various socio-economic conditions prepare for almost a lifetime to participate at the Olympic Games," but that, due to Rule 40.3 of the Olympic Charter, "it is only marginally possible for athletes worldwide to advertise with partners and sponsors in the economically most important phase of their sporting career." Given that the "IOC monopolizes the marketing of the Olympic Games," the GAC has demanded "a distribution of 25 percent of the total profit from the marketing and transmission revenues of the IOC to athletes."
182 The response of Bach to the demand has been to agree to meet with German athletes "so that he can 'discuss and explain' the ways in which they support and finance Olympians."
183 He maintains that "the IOC distributes 90 per cent of its income to sport and to supporting the athletes," 184 a position supported by Kirsty Coventry, the chair of the IOC Athletes' Commission, who said that:
[T]he first priority of the IOC is to organise the Olympic Games … All other revenue distribution by the IOC is in the interests of the athletes through the [IFs] which allow the [NFs] to organise competitions for the athletes and to support the athletes, and also to the [NOCs] … to give them the opportunity to prepare their athletes for the Olympic Games and to support their athletes in the way they deem appropriate.
185
The right of athletes to legally share in the revenue created by the work of athletes is one that presently only exists because of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") in countries including the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in sports and leagues as diverse as the NFL have revenue-sharing mechanisms that define the revenue to be shared with players and how the agreed percentage is to be distributed, including through a wage-fixing structure underpinned by a negotiated set of minimum wages and conditions of employment. The CBAs see percentages of defined revenues between 27.5% and 36.56% shared with players, where the SGB is a not-for-profit body with broad responsibilities for the development of the relevant sport, and 47% to 50% shared by the privately owned profit-driven professional sports leagues. Accordingly, they illustrate how collective bargaining can shape the development of financial models that address the broad objectives stated by the IOC.
Global sport now sees two distinct systems of work. The first, institutionalized and promoted by the IOC and reinforced by requirements of global sports law such as Rules 21 and 40 of the Olympic Charter, is one that is implemented without assessing the impact of that system on the status of the athletes as workers, the rights of the athletes to organize and share in the wealth they create including through decent work and, moreover, the negative human rights impacts of that system of work on athletes. It differs markedly from that promoted by FIFA due, in the main, to the long history of collective activism by players in the professional football industry. FIFA expressly recognizes professional footballers as employees under labor contracts and the role of collective bargaining within its regulatory framework.
192 In May 2017, in reporting on its human rights record in accordance with the FIFA Ruggie Report, FIFA noted that "[s]ome of the main achievements" included "the broadening of engagement with football stakeholders, including with the international union of professional football players FIFPro, towards enhancing the protection of players' rights,"
193 and a "significantly increased engagement with relevant stakeholders, in particular with organisations representing the interests of professional footballers." Open would agree to equal prize money for women's singles players that year, with the three other tennis Grand Slam tournaments following suit only after a 34-year struggle that encompassed the Australian Open (2001), the French Open (2006), and, finally, Wimbledon in 2007. 196 The modern champions of women's tennis understand their inheritance and the responsibility that comes with it.
197 However, according to King herself on the narrowing of the "great gender gap," "women's sports will have arrived only when women's team sports are accepted."
198
In 2015, FIFA paid the United States Soccer Federation ("USSF") US $2 million for winning the FIFA Women's World Cup in Canada only a year after paying the German Football Association US$35 million for winning the 2014 FIFA World Cup (for men). 199 In the months leading up to the tournament, FIFA was required to respond to the matter of Wambach v. Canadian Soccer Association and Fédération Internationale de Football Association, 200 a class action suit involving more than 60 players from 13 countries brought before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario ("HRTO") on October 1, 2014. In their claim, the players collectively alleged that the Canadian Soccer Association ("CSA") and FIFA had discriminated against them because of sex contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended ("the HRC"), by forcing the players to play World Cup games on artificial turf. This, the players asserted, constituted unlawful discrimination in three significant ways: … (1) by forcing them to compete on a surface that fundamentally alters the way the game is played, (2) by subjecting them to unique and serious risks of injury, and (3) by devaluing their dignity, state of mind, and self-respect as a result of requiring them to play on a second-class surface before tens of thousands of stadium spectators and a global broadcast audience.
201
In 1986, the HRTO held in Blainey v. Ontario Hockey Association that the right to participate "in athletic activity without discrimination is guaranteed by s. 1 of the [HRC] ."
202
On October 27, 2014, the lawyers for the players filed a request for an interim remedy, in which it was asserted that "the CSA and FIFA-aided by national federations-[had] threatened a coalition of the world's best female soccer players for bringing the sex discrimination action." 203 The request asked the HRTO "to order the respondents and their affiliates to cease all attempts to engage in or threaten reprisals against players who have joined or who are considering joining this action."
204 The reprisals allegedly included "not be [ing] invited to participate as a member of the Mexican national team,"
205 "retaliation by FIFA in the awarding of the 2019 women's World Cup,"
206 being "told by Costa Rican Federation Officials that their participation put their positions on the team in jeopardy as a result of pressure from CSA and FIFA," 207 and that involvement in the action may be contrary to bylaws of the USSF, which include "the claim that: 'For a violation of this bylaw, the offending party shall be subject to suspension …'" 208 The request for interim relief referred to two Canadian court authorities involving the CSA. The first "detailed how the possibility of missing a major soccer tournament was a patently irreparable harm,"
209 the second declared that "express threats to harm someone for going to court or … punishing him for having done so … was contrary to 'public policy'."
210
On November 7, 2014, the HRTO denied an application by the players for an expedited hearing. 211 The following January, the players withdrew their application. Wambach, the public face of the action, a leading member of the United States team, and the 2012 FIFA Women's Footballer of the Year, said:
On behalf of the players, I want to thank all who aided our fight for natural grass fields at the 2015 World Cup including our volunteer lawyers from Canada and the United States … Our legal action has ended. But I am hopeful that the players' willingness to contest the unequal playing fields-and the tremendous public support we received during the effort-marks the start of even greater activism to ensure fair treatment when it comes to women's sports.
The FIFA Ruggie Report noted the important questions raised by the action, describing the system as a "closed loop." 213 It recommended that "FIFA should ensure that its own dispute resolution bodies have adequate human rights expertise and procedures to address human rights claims, and urge member associations, confederations and the [CAS] to do the same."
214
Despite the threats of reprisal and the withdrawal of the action, the period since has witnessed a powerful wave of collective action by women footballers, including players in Ireland, 215 Denmark, 216 The Netherlands, 217 Finland,
218
Chile, 219 Argentina, 220 Brazil, 221 the United States, 222 Norway, 223 and Australia.
224
The actions sought to address a lack of opportunity or decent pay and conditions. The United States action aimed to address unequal pay between players in the men's and women's national teams, which are both employed by the USSF. In many ways, equal pay is at the heart of the matter. A recommendation of the 2018 IOC Gender Equality Review Project 225 calls for "NOCs and IFs to establish mechanisms to address inequalities between genders in prize money and other athlete payments," with "transition plans to close the gender pay gap" to be actioned by December 2020.
226
FIFA, given its status as an IF, the collective activism of women players, and its human rights commitments, 227 is almost certain to have to address the question of equal prize money for the FIFA Women's World Cup France 2019, 228 an event to which FIFA aims to attract a global television audience of one billion viewers.
229 As amended by the FIFA Congress in February 2016, the statutory objectives of FIFA now include "to use its efforts to ensure that the game of football is available to and resourced for all who wish to participate, regardless of gender or age,"
230 and "to promote the development of women's football and the full participation of women at all levels of football governance."
231 At the same time, the FIFA Congress included the words "gender equality" into the heading of Article 4 of the FIFA Statutes, which prohibits discrimination. The "internationally recognised human rights" referred to in Article 3 of the FIFA Statutes encompass gender discrimination, with it being identified by the FIFA Human Rights Policy, May 2017 edition ("FIFA Human Rights Policy") as a "salient human rights risk."
232 Accordingly, "FIFA places particular emphasis on identifying and addressing differential impacts based on gender and on promoting gender equality and preventing all forms of harassment, including sexual harassment."
233
The UDHR provides that,"[e]veryone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work."
234 Article 11 of the 1981 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 235 calls on States parties to "eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment" acknowledging the right "to work as an inalienable right of all human beings," 236 and "to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work." 237 The principle of "equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value" is also enshrined in Article 2 of ILO C100.
238
Equal prize money for women players, therefore, sits clearly as not only an objective of FIFA, but also a commitment and responsibility. A central question is the relative value of work provided by men and women players. To give effect to equal pay in 2019, FIFA would be required to invest US$336 million, a little under 6% of its reported budgeted revenue for the 2015-2018 period. FIFA will pay just over 7% of its revenue for that period as prize money for the 2018 FIFA World Cup Russia, a very low percentage given the importance of the tournament to FIFA's overall financial model. Revenue from the 2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil totaled US$4.826 billion, 85% of FIFA revenue for the four-year cycle between 2011 and 2014.
239 As US$358 million was paid as prize money to the men's teams, who are understood to share no more than 50% with the players, the men's share of revenue cannot be more than about 2.5% of revenue and therefore not reflective of the value of the work provided. 240 According to the World Players Association Gender Equality Principles as published by the WPA in April 2016, "any disparity in the revenue generated by the sporting sector in which men are performing equivalent work can only be taken into account if the men are receiving a fair and equitable share of that revenue, usually measured in the form of a collective bargaining agreement."
241
If FIFA's Member Associations were obliged to share 50% of equal prize money with their women players, the outcome would be one that would transform the careers of 552 of the world's best players. According to the FIFPro Global Employment Report for Women's Professional Football, 50% of players are not paid by their clubs, 35% are not paid by their national teams, 66% of national team players are not satisfied with tournament prize money, and, consequently, 87% consider quitting the game early.
242 However, as the experience of the more than 60 players who sought to achieve equality of on-field playing conditions in Canada in 2015 shows, a powerful claim backed by collective activism may not be enough. The "jurisdictional complexity" of a case transnational in nature, 243 the alleged threats of reprisal, the irreparable harm that would follow missing the tournament, and the fact that time can be of the essence, could again conspire to prevent the players from attaining the effective remedy they seek-equal prize money. At the global level, individual and collective activism are not enough. Institutional activism is also essential.
C. Institutional Athlete Activism
Addressing the Human and Athlete Rights Impacts of Global Sport
Institutional athlete activism is anchored in the same powerful values system that has informed individual and collective activism, but involves sharing that system of values across a multi-stakeholder platform of like-minded organizations, key stakeholders of global sport, and the international human rights community. Its emergence lies in global sport's failure to embed internationally recognized human rights into its governance framework, and the devastating human and athlete rights impacts to which that failure has caused or contributed. The organization of the Olympic Games and other mega-sporting events "have come under repeated scrutiny from human rights experts and campaigners over a gamut of concerns."
244 According to DeMaurice Smith, the Executive Director of the NFLPA and a member of the Executive Committee of the WPA, the athletes "need to take back the beauty and the humanity of sport. We need to move to a world where the integrity of sport does not tolerate migrant workers in Qatar who die building stadiums."
245
The theory of change driving institutional athlete activism is summarized in Figure 2 . Two impactful endeavors of institutional athlete activism-the Sport and Rights Alliance ("SRA") and the Centre for Sport and Human Rights ("CSHR")-have been instrumental in seeing major SGBs make a series of important human rights commitments since 2016 and start to ensure that adverse human and athlete rights impacts are prevented and addressed by global sport.
Endeavors of Institutional Athlete Activism
(a) The SRA The SRA "is an unprecedented global coalition of leading Non-Governmental Organisations ("NGOs") and trade unions"-including Amnesty International, the Committee to Protect Journalists, Football Supporters Europe, Human Rights Watch, the International Trade Union Confederation, Terre des Hommes, Transparency International Germany, and the WPA-"working together to embed human rights and anti-corruption across world sport and to promote the rights and well-being of those most affected by human rights risks associated with the delivery of sport … including children, women, activists, minorities, fans, athletes, and other workers."
246 Founded in early 2015 to pressure SGBs to ensure their decision-making and operations respect international standards for human rights, labor rights, and anti-corruption, in accordance with the UNGPs, 245 Sanctions, however, are not remedial. The other glaring weakness of the human rights protections of the HCC (as welcome as they are) is that, without the incorporation of internationally recognized human rights into 'Olympic law,' the protections are confined to the parties to the HCC-the IOC, the host city, the host NOC, and the OCOG. The victims of human rights abuse lack the privity to enforce the HCC in order to access an effective remedy, even though the "right to effective remedy is a foundational human rights principle." 270 The HCC, therefore, needs to sit as part of a larger institutional framework of transnational law, a framework that, by being shared with key stakeholders and affected groups, can enjoy a level of legitimacy presently lacking with lex sportiva and 'Olympic law.'
271 Emerging global systems of private law are not unique to sport. "[P]rivate actors-including corporations, civil society, the media, and individuals-separately and together can create a system of rule-making and rule-enforcement that may be more effective than public lawmaking standing alone."
272 Unlike public law, it is not based on the monopolistic power to make and enforce behavioral rules. 273 Unlike lex sportiva, it does not depend on mandatory arbitration enforced through a lack of consent that is indisputable. Unlike 'Olympic law,' it is not imposed at the behest of a private entity seeking to exert its commercial interests. Instead, "[m]ultinational corporations may have authority and power as never before to legislate, but legislation is not made in a vacuum. Authority must be shared. Authority is shared with other emerging powers: the great institutions of civil society and the great institutions of information diffusion."
274
(b) The CSHR The need for collective action through an independent institution drove the significant multi-stakeholder commitment that on June 26, 2018, culminated with the announcement of the formal establishment of the CSHR by its chair, Mary Robinson, the former President of Ireland and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. 275 The establishment of the CSHR is the work of an "unprecedented alliance [which] includes intergovernmental organisations, governments, sports bodies, athletes, hosts, sponsors, broadcasters, civil society representatives, trade unions, employers and their associations, and national human rights institutions."
276
The vision of the CSHR is "[a] world of sport that fully respects human rights."
277 The CSHR's functions centre on "the promotion of effective approaches to prevention, mitigation, and remedy of adverse human rights impacts."
278
It will be governed by a board of independent trustees who will be elected by an advisory council in which six key stakeholders are given equal status: (1) intergovernmental organizations; (2) governments; (3) trade unions (including the WPA); (4) NGOs and National Human Rights Institutes; (5) sponsors, broadcasters, and commercial partners; and (6) sports bodies and organizing committees, including the IOC, FIFA, UEFA, and the CGF. 279 The trustees, therefore, will be accountable for the attainment of the CSHR's statutory objectives, which enshrine the Sporting Chance Principles committed to by all members of the advisory council. 280 They demand that "human rights are taken account of at all times,"
281 "affected groups have a voice in decision-making … including athletes, fans, communities, workers, children, volunteers, journalists, human rights defenders, and potentially marginalised groups,"
282 "access to remedy is available,"
283 and "collective action is harnessed to realise human rights."
284
According to Championing Human Rights in the Governance of Sports Bodies¸ a guide published on March 31, 2018, by the Mega-Sporting Events Platform for Human Rights-the forerunner to the CSHR-with input from the IOC, FIFA, UEFA, and the CGF ("Championing Human Rights"), 285 aligning sporting values with human rights requires "[a]rticulating a mission and values and how this is reconciled with an organisation's purpose and activities."
286 SGBs, for example, "typically have policies, systems and processes to address integrity issues and should ensure that respect for human rights are integrated within these," as "[r]espect for human rights is a key part of the integrity of sport." 287 In order to implement human rights in the governance of SGBs, Championing Human Rights sets out four steps that SGBs "should follow … to demonstrate they are promoting the values of sport and showing respect for human rights in line with best practice and international norms, notably the [UNGPs]." 288 They are: (1) commit and embed including by making a public commitment to respect human rights; (2) identify any actual and potential risks to human rights and prioritize action; (3) take action to address risks and provide access to remedy where necessary; and (4) report and communicate how the organization is addressing risks to human rights. 289 In this way, the four key recommendations follow the four pillars of the FIFA Human Rights Policy and set a clear standard of expected behavior for global sport. 
Institutional Athlete Activism and Reforming Global Sport
Institutional activism aims to change the very system that places the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms in conflict with the practice of sport and to hold sport to account for any human rights harms that it has caused or to which it has contributed. Accordingly, if successful, institutional activism will involve a number of profound yet positive changes to the governance of SGBs and the human and athlete rights impacts of global sport.
The first will be to the substantive content of global sports law, including lex sportiva and 'Olympic law.' The policy commitment required as an initial step will require SGBs to define and embed within global sports law including in key constitutional documents such as the Olympic Charter and the FIFA Statutes those "higher-ranking rules that prevail" over conflicting regulations of the SGB and to render such regulations "invalid as inconsistent."
291 For the first time, the higher-ranking rules must respect international human rights instruments, principles, and standards, including the UNGPs, the OECD Guidelines, the ILO Declaration, and the MNE Declaration. As the history and renewal of athlete activism makes clear, this is presently not the case on vital human rights matters. The outcomes will include the establishment of a system of decent work for athletes, and the enhanced legitimacy of global sports law. Further, by respecting the enabling rights of freedom of expression and the right to organize, the rights of athletes to champion human rights both within and through global sport will be respected.
A second profound change will be to the manner in which global sports law is developed, promulgated, and implemented. The second and fourth key recommendations of Championing Human Rights demand that a proactive, inclusive, and transparent approach be taken to identifying actual and potential human rights risks. These recommendations build on the framework of the UNGPs and key aspects of the OECD Guidelines and the MNE Declaration, especially the process of human rights due diligence, a process that is presently absent from the governance of almost all SGBs. According to the OECD Guidelines, human 288 Id., at 7. 289 Id. 290 Supra¸ notes 232 and 248. 291 Chand, supra, note 9, at para. 449. rights due diligence "entails assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses as well as communicating how impacts are addressed … It is an on-going exercise, recognising that human rights risks may change over time …" 292 An essential aspect of due diligence is that "it is informed by engagement with stakeholders … who are persons or groups who have interests that could be affected by an enterprise's activities." 293 Stakeholder engagement "is characterized by two-way communication … involves the timely sharing of the relevant information stakeholders need to make informed decisions," and, "to be meaningful, engagement involves the good faith of all parties."
294 Due diligence also essentially entails "[c]ommunicating information on due diligence processes, findings and plans. It enables the enterprise to build trust in its actions and decision-making, and demonstrate good faith. An enterprise should account for how it identifies and addresses actual or potential adverse impacts and should communicate accordingly." 295 Similarly, the MNE Declaration provides that the "process should take account of the central role of freedom of association and collective bargaining as well as industrial relations and social dialogue as an ongoing process."
296
A third profound change demands that those who suffer an adverse human rights impact can access an effective remedy. Without this step, sport and human rights cannot be reconciled. Access to an effective remedy is required to address the situation where SGBs "identify through their human rights due diligence process or other means that they have caused or contributed to an adverse impact."
297 Following the "protect, respect, remedy" framework of the UNGPs and, in particular, Principle 31 of the UNGPs, 298 the OECD Guidelines:
… recommend that enterprises have processes in place to enable remediation. Some situations require cooperation with judicial or Statebased non-judicial mechanisms. In others, operational-level grievance mechanisms for those potentially impacted by enterprises' activities can be an effective means of providing for such processes when they meet the core criteria of: legitimacy, accessibility, predictability, equitability, compatibility with the [OECD] Guidelines and transparency, and are based on dialogue and engagement with a view to seeking agreed solutions.
299
Apologies, restitution, reinstatement of dismissed workers, recognition of trade unions for the purposes of collective bargaining, financial or non-financial compensation (such as establishing compensation funds for victims, or for future outreach and educational programs), or punitive sanctions are among the available remedies that may be appropriate based on the circumstances and nature of the human rights impacts.
300
Meeting these recommendations is well within the capability of preeminent SGBs, such as the IOC, FIFA, UEFA, and the CGF. The human and athlete rights impacts considered in this article reveal that, where affected groups are unable to access an effective remedy, there are three main gaps: (1) where, such as with the IOC HCC, human rights commitments have been made by a SGB, but are not accessible to affected groups; 301 (2) where a grievance mechanism has been established-such as the CAS-but does not meet the core requirements of the UNGPs or the OECD Guidelines; 302 and (3) where neither the human rights commitments have been made nor the requisite grievance mechanisms established. Further, if the filling of these gaps is approached through the paradigm of business and human rights law instead of global sports law, new opportunities to address adverse human rights impacts in sport will emerge. The Permanent Court of Arbitration is the seat of arbitration under the landmark Bangladesh Accord. 303 Much work is being undertaken to establish global rules for business and human rights arbitration. 304 Should SGBs be unwilling to adapt, affected groups, including athletes, will be certain to assert their fundamental human right to access an effective remedy outside of the institutional framework of sport.
IV. Conclusion
Three great movements-global sport, the cause of universal human rights, and athlete activism-are each driven by their own powerful values systems. These values, which have been passed down from generation to generation, also have much in common. They stand for human dignity and the social power of sport, demonstrating how sport provides both the occasions to celebrate humanity and, due to its intensity, scale, and reach, the circumstances to impact people negatively. Sport is, by its nature, a shared experience. Yet the institutions that govern it are, all too often, exclusive in their approach.
The generational learnings of these three great movements are finally coalescing to create the opportunity to reconcile sport and human rights. Just as sport is a shared experience, the transnational legal framework that governs it must now also be shared. A commitment to embedding internationally recognized human rights in global sport has now been made by six key stakeholder groups: SGBs; governments; leading intergovernmental agencies such as the UN and the ILO; business and the brands; NGOs; and the trade union movement, including the organized voice of athletes. Much work remains to be done to convert that commitment into genuine reconciliation. Substantive, cultural, and institutional change is demanded. Without it, adverse human and athlete rights impacts will not be prevented when they should, and those whose rights are violated will continue to be denied a remedy.
For this work to be completed, athlete activism will remain essential-individually, collectively, and institutionally. Moreover, the three levels of athlete activism will need to engage strategically with each other, not only for the benefit of athletes, but for everyone touched by sport. If global sport is to be a true force for good and celebrate humanity throughout the world, it must first protect, respect, and uphold the human rights of those who make it possible.
